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The Timpson Lyceum · History of Philosophy (2024)

Proving God (Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and Kurt Godel’s Proofs)

Overview

This lecture surveys the major philosophical arguments for the existence of God, tracing a single tradition from the medieval a priori proof of Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), through the a posteriori Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), to their modern descendants (the fine-tuning argument) and, finally, the fully formalized modal-logic proof of Kurt Gödel (1906–1978). The aim is expository — to make each argument intelligible — rather than to evaluate or refute it. The throughline is a steady increase in logical rigor: from Anselm's conceptual reductio, to Aquinas's causal reasoning grounded in Aristotelian metaphysics, to Gödel's axiom-driven derivation in second-order modal logic.

These arguments matter because they define the classic options in natural theology — attempts to establish God's existence by reason alone, without appeal to revelation. Anselm's ontological argument reasons purely from the concept of God; Aquinas's Ways reason from observed features of the world (motion, causation, contingency, gradation, order); and the modern design and fine-tuning arguments update the fifth Way with contemporary cosmology and biology. Gödel's proof, examined line by line in the following lecture, recasts Anselm's insight in symbolic form, making its assumptions explicit and its validity mechanically checkable.

Key Concepts

Worked Example

Anselm's ontological argument as a formal reductio. Let GG name the individual God, and read ∃!\exists! informally as "there is such a being." Define the property Greater(a,b)\text{Greater}(a, b) as "aa is greater than bb," and split existence into existing in the intellect (InInt\text{InInt}) versus in reality (InReal\text{InReal}). Anselm's key premise is that real existence adds greatness.

  1. Definition. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived:

¬ ◊ ∃x [Greater(x,G)].\neg\,\Diamond\,\exists x\,\big[\text{Greater}(x, G)\big].

That is, it is not even conceivable that something be greater than God.

  1. Premise (existence-in-the-mind). God exists at least in the intellect — the concept is understood even by "the fool": InInt(G)\text{InInt}(G).
  2. Premise (reality outranks intellect). For any conceivable being, existing in reality is greater than existing in the intellect alone:

∀x [(InInt(x)∧¬ InReal(x))  →  ◊ ∃y Greater(y,x)].\forall x\,\big[\big(\text{InInt}(x)\wedge\neg\,\text{InReal}(x)\big)\;\rightarrow\;\Diamond\,\exists y\,\text{Greater}(y, x)\big].

  1. Assumption for contradiction. Suppose God exists only in the intellect: InInt(G)∧¬ InReal(G)\text{InInt}(G)\wedge\neg\,\text{InReal}(G).
  2. Apply step 3 to GG. Then it is conceivable that some being yy is greater than God — namely one exactly like God but also existing in reality:

◊ ∃y Greater(y,G).\Diamond\,\exists y\,\text{Greater}(y, G).

  1. Contradiction. Step 5 directly denies step 1 (¬ ◊ ∃x Greater(x,G)\neg\,\Diamond\,\exists x\,\text{Greater}(x, G)). The assumption in step 4 is therefore false.
  2. Conclusion. Negating step 4, and given InInt(G)\text{InInt}(G) from step 2, God must exist in reality:

InReal(G).■\text{InReal}(G). \qquad \blacksquare

The move under scrutiny is step 3 — the assumption that real existence makes a being greater — which is precisely where later critics (and Gödel's more careful formalization) concentrate their attention.

Summary