The Timpson Lyceum · History of Philosophy (2024)

The Greco-Persian Wars – Lecture 7 (History of Philosophy)

Overview

The course pauses its march through the philosophers to fill in the history they lived through: the Greco-Persian Wars (499–449 BC). These wars overlap the lives of nearly every thinker covered so far, and they set the stage for the golden age of Athens — the world of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to come.

The story runs from the Ionian Revolt (the Greek city-states of the Anatolian coast rising against their Persian-installed tyrants), through Persia's punitive invasions of the Greek mainland, to the famous clashes — Marathon, Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. The central puzzle the lecture keeps returning to: how could a scattering of small, often-feuding Greek city-states defeat the largest empire on earth? The answers — the hoplite phalanx, the resolve of free citizens, superior naval tactics in narrow waters, and Persian overreach — also explain why Athens rose afterward to lead the Delian League, setting up the Peloponnesian War.

Key Concepts

• The Ionian city-states — Greek trading colonies (Miletus, Samos, and others) on the coast of Asia Minor. Wealthy and semi-autonomous under Lydia, they were conquered by Cyrus the Great (~547 BC) and ruled harshly through tyrants, because each independent polis had to be controlled individually.
• Satrap — A Persian provincial governor. The empire was divided into provinces, each under a satrap (Sardis was the capital of the Lydian province).
• The Ionian Revolt (499–493 BC) — Sparked when the tyrant of Miletus failed to take Naxos and, to save himself, launched a revolt. Athens and Eretria sent aid; the rebels sacked Sardis (498). Sparta refused to help (fear of leaving their helots, i.e. their slave population, and of long campaigns). The revolt collapsed at the Battle of Lade when Samos switched sides; Miletus was razed.
• "Earth and water" — Darius's demand for tribute, troops, and a symbolic gift of earth and water signifying submission. The Greeks accepted the first two in principle but rejected submission absolutely — a free citizen would not become a subject. Athens and Sparta famously threw the envoys into a pit and a well.
• The hoplite phalanx — Heavy infantry with large shields and long spears, packed so several ranks could strike at once. Nearly unbreakable head-on, but vulnerable on the flanks and slow to turn — the tactical key to Greek land victories.
• Marathon (490 BC) — ~10,000 Greeks (Athenians + Plataeans) vs. ~46,000 Persians. A thinned Greek center held while the wings enveloped the Persian flanks. A stunning Greek victory (~192 Athenian dead vs. ~6,400 Persian); origin of the "marathon" run.
• Thermopylae (480 BC) — Leonidas's ~300 Spartans (plus several thousand allies) held the narrow pass against Xerxes' vast army for days until betrayed via a hidden path. A tactical defeat but a moral rallying cry.
• Salamis (480 BC) — The turning point. Themistocles lured the larger Persian fleet into the narrow straits where heavy Greek triremes could ram the lighter Persian ships. Decisive Greek naval victory.
• Plataea & Mycale (479 BC) — Plataea destroyed the Persian land army in Greece; Mycale destroyed the Persian fleet. Roughly back-to-back, they ended Persia's offensive threat.
• The Delian League — Athens's postwar naval alliance: members contributed ships or money. Over time Athens forbade members to leave, turning the league into an Athenian empire — the wealth and power that built the Parthenon and provoked the Peloponnesian War.

Worked Example

Why kill-to-death ratios, not raw numbers, decided the war. The Greeks were almost always outnumbered, so victory required inflicting far more casualties than they suffered. Compare the ratios from the major battles:

1. Marathon: Persian dead $\approx 6{,}400$, Greek dead $\approx 192$. Ratio $= \dfrac{6400}{192} \approx 33.3$ Persian deaths per Greek death.
2. Thermopylae: Persian dead $\approx 20{,}000$, Greek dead $\approx 4{,}000$. Ratio $= \dfrac{20000}{4000} = 5$ — and yet this was a Greek defeat, because those 4,000 losses hurt the smaller Greek manpower pool proportionally more.
3. The lesson in numbers: at Marathon a $\sim 33{:}1$ exchange let ~10,000 Greeks shatter a force of ~46,000. Suppose two sides trade at ratio $r$ (enemy losses per friendly loss). The smaller side of size $G$ can defeat a larger side of size $P$ only if it can impose enough losses to break morale before being ground down — roughly, it needs $r \gtrsim \frac{P}{G}.$
4. At Marathon, $\dfrac{P}{G} = \dfrac{46000}{10000} = 4.6$, while the actual ratio $r \approx 33$ — vastly above the break-even, hence a rout.
5. Why such lopsided ratios? The key point: in ancient battle most deaths happen during the rout, not the clash. A cohesive phalanx that refuses to break suffers few losses while a fleeing enemy is cut down en masse. Free citizens fighting for home were far less likely to break than conscripts fighting far away — so the Greeks won the ratio, and thus the war. $\blacksquare$

Summary

• The Greco-Persian Wars (499–449 BC) began with the Ionian Revolt and became Persia's attempt to punish and conquer mainland Greece.
• Only ~30 city-states united against Persia; many stayed neutral or joined the invaders. What they would not accept was submission ("earth and water").
• Greek victories rested on the hoplite phalanx on land and heavy ramming triremes in narrow waters — Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea/Mycale being the decisive turns.
• The deeper cause was morale and casualty ratios: free citizens held the line, and most killing happened in the enemy's rout — so a smaller force could defeat a much larger one.
• Victory made Athens the head of the Delian League, which hardened into an empire — funding the Athenian golden age and setting the stage for the coming Peloponnesian War (and the era of Socrates).