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The Timpson Lyceum · First-Order Predicate Logic (2024)

Common Tautologies and Indirect Proof - Lecture 3 (Logic)

Overview

This lecture consolidates the machinery for justifying valid rules of logic and then introduces a powerful new proof technique. We first review how a truth table certifies that an implication is a tautological implication (and therefore a valid rule of logic), and why a counterexample certifies that a rule is invalid. We then catalog the most common tautologies (modus ponens, modus tollens, the syllogisms, De Morgan's laws, contraposition, and more) and discuss why F→FF \to F and F→TF \to T are vacuously true. Finally we introduce the notion of consistent vs. inconsistent premises and the rule of reductio ad absurdum — indirect proof — reproving an earlier result by contradiction. The big theme: truth tables discover simple rules, but derivations are what let us prove things tables cannot.

Key Concepts

Valid rule of logic. A rule α→β\alpha \to \beta is valid exactly when it is a tautological implication — true under every sentential interpretation. Equivalently: every atomic interpretation is true, which holds iff the rule's truth table is true in every row.

Invalid rule (counterexample). A rule is invalid if one interpretation makes the premises true and the conclusion false. A single FF in the result column is such a counterexample. For instance α→β\alpha \to \beta is not a valid rule of logic, because the row α=T, β=F\alpha = T,\ \beta = F gives FF. Warning: finding one interpretation that comes out true does not establish a rule — validity requires truth in every row.

Vacuous truth. An implication is vacuously true when its antecedent cannot be satisfied; by definition F→T=TF \to T = T and F→F=TF \to F = T. Three ways to make peace with this:

Rules of derivation (these govern proofs; they are not themselves rules of logic — Rule T lets us use rules of logic):

Common tautologies (each provable by truth table; internalize them rather than memorizing names):

The last two are the only rules stated as something other than implications; they may be inserted into a derivation out of nowhere (via Rule T, implied by nothing).

Consistency. A set of premises is consistent if they can all be true together; inconsistent if it is impossible for all of them to be true at once. Consistent does not mean true, only that some interpretation satisfies them all. Show inconsistency two ways: (1) the conjunction of all premises is false in every truth-table row, or (2) derive a contradiction from them. From inconsistent premises you can prove anything (a contradiction is always false, and FF implies everything), so logic only has something to say about consistent premise sets.

Worked Example

Prove A→¬DA \to \lnot D from the premises A→(B∨C)A \to (B \lor C), B→¬AB \to \lnot A, and D→¬CD \to \lnot C, using indirect proof (RAA).

We assume the negation of the goal and derive a contradiction. Since ¬(A→¬D)≡A∧D\lnot(A \to \lnot D) \equiv A \land D, we assume A∧DA \land D and aim for some X∧¬XX \land \lnot X:

1. A→(B∨C)Rule P2. B→¬ARule P3. D→¬CRule P4. A∧Dassume ¬(goal), since ¬(A→¬D)≡A∧D5. Asimplification, 46. B∨Cmodus ponens, 1,57. Dsimplification, 48. ¬Cmodus ponens, 3,79. Bdisjunctive syllogism, 6,810. ¬Amodus ponens, 2,911. A∧¬Acontradiction, 5,1012. ¬(A∧D)Rule RAA, discharging 4 (lines 4–11)13. A→¬Dsince ¬(A∧D)≡¬A∨¬D≡A→¬D\begin{aligned} &1.\ A \to (B \lor C) &&\text{Rule P} \\ &2.\ B \to \lnot A &&\text{Rule P} \\ &3.\ D \to \lnot C &&\text{Rule P} \\ &4.\ A \land D &&\text{assume } \lnot(\text{goal}),\ \text{since } \lnot(A \to \lnot D)\equiv A\land D \\ &5.\ A &&\text{simplification, } 4 \\ &6.\ B \lor C &&\text{modus ponens, } 1,5 \\ &7.\ D &&\text{simplification, } 4 \\ &8.\ \lnot C &&\text{modus ponens, } 3,7 \\ &9.\ B &&\text{disjunctive syllogism, } 6,8 \\ &10.\ \lnot A &&\text{modus ponens, } 2,9 \\ &11.\ A \land \lnot A &&\text{contradiction, } 5,10 \\ &12.\ \lnot(A \land D) &&\text{Rule RAA, discharging } 4\ (\text{lines } 4\text{–}11) \\ &13.\ A \to \lnot D &&\text{since } \lnot(A \land D)\equiv \lnot A \lor \lnot D \equiv A \to \lnot D \end{aligned}

Assuming A∧DA \land D forced both AA and ¬A\lnot A — an absurdity — so the assumption is rejected and the goal A→¬DA \to \lnot D follows from premises 1–3 alone.

Summary