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The Timpson Lyceum · History of Rome – Titus Livius (2025)

Tullus Hostilius, Third King of Rome– Lecture 4 (History of Rome)

Overview

Tullus Hostilius, the third king of Rome (traditionally reigning 673–642 BC), is Livy's deliberate mirror-image of his predecessor. Where Numa Pompilius had given Rome two generations of peace and religion, Tullus was restlessly warlike — more warlike even than Romulus, in Livy's judgment. Grandson of the warrior Hostus Hostilius, who had fallen fighting the Sabines under Romulus, Tullus set out to drag Rome back to a conquering culture and treated Numa's religious apparatus as a waste of time.

His reign matters because it stages Rome's first great act of consolidation: the war with Alba Longa, the mother-city of the Latin people, settled by champion combat — the Horatii against the Curiatii — and ended by Alba's outright destruction and the absorption of its population into Rome. That single act roughly doubled Rome's manpower, added a hundred noble Alban families to the Senate, and set the pattern Rome would follow for centuries: defeat a neighbor, then swallow it whole rather than merely tax it. Tullus' end is equally instructive about the Roman mind — struck down (by plague, or by Jupiter's lightning for botched rites) after a life spent scorning the gods.

Key Concepts

Worked Example

Why a 3-vs-3 duel beat a pitched battle — and how one man beat three.

Set the war of Rome against Alba Longa (traditionally c. 667 BC, within Tullus' reign that runs from 673673 to 642642 BC) as a decision problem. Each side fields roughly the army Rome would soon possess: about 6,0006{,}000 men.

  1. Cost of a full battle. Even a moderate engagement costs the winner around 10%10\% and the loser around 30%30\% of their men. Total dead:

0.10×6000+0.30×6000=600+1800=2400.0.10 \times 6000 + 0.30 \times 6000 = 600 + 1800 = 2400.

  1. Cost of a champion duel. At most the six triplets die:

max deaths=3+3=6.\text{max deaths} = 3 + 3 = 6.

  1. The ratio that made the choice obvious. The proxy fight is cheaper by

24006=400×,\frac{2400}{6} = 400\times,

and — decisively — neither surviving army is weakened, so the watching Etruscans gain nothing. Both kings preferred a 3×33\times3 gamble to a 6000×60006000\times6000 bloodletting.

  1. The tactical problem inside the duel. Early on, two Horatii fell, but all three Curiatii were wounded — in different degrees — while the last Horatius was untouched. Facing three foes at once is near-suicidal. Suppose each still-standing opponent lands a disabling blow in a given exchange with probability a=0.2a = 0.2. Fighting all three simultaneously, the chance he is hit in one round is

1−(1−0.2)3=1−0.512=0.488,1 - (1 - 0.2)^3 = 1 - 0.512 = 0.488,

almost a coin-flip every round.

  1. Separation changes the arithmetic. By feigning flight, the unwounded Horatius drew the wounded men into a strung-out pursuit, so he met them one at a time. Against a single opponent the per-round danger drops to

a=0.2,a = 0.2,

less than half the 0.4880.488 he faced against the trio.

  1. Winning all three. Treating the three sequential duels as independent, with a high single-duel win probability p=0.85p = 0.85 (he is fresh; they are wounded and tiring), his chance to sweep all three is

p3=0.853≈0.61,p^3 = 0.85^3 \approx 0.61,

versus a far smaller chance in a simultaneous 3-on-1. The most wounded Curiatius, reached last and exhausted, "barely put up a fight." By converting one 11-vs-33 into three 11-vs-11 contests, Horatius turned a near-certain death into a better-than-even victory — and won Rome the mastery of Alba. ■\blacksquare

Summary